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Introduction 
The financial crisis has sparked proposals to reform 
the retirement income system.  One component of 
such a system could be a new tier of retirement ac-
counts.  These accounts would augment declining 
Social Security replacement rates for low-wage work-
ers and provide a buffer of security for middle- and 
upper-wage workers who, increasingly, will rely totally 
on 401(k) plans to supplement their Social Security.  
Designing such a new tier requires answering a num-
ber of questions:  Mandatory or voluntary?  Employee 
and/or employer contributions?  Subsidies for low 
earners?  Payments as lump sums or annuities?  Tax 
favored or not?  But the most fundamental question 
is whether the goal of the new tier is to provide a 
defined contribution account, where the retirement 
income will depend on market performance, or an 
account that can provide a certain percent of final 
earnings – that is, a target replacement rate.  
This brief takes the first step in exploring the ques-
tion of how much risk is acceptable.  The first section 
makes the case for a new tier of retirement income.  
The second section describes the implications of us-
ing a defined contribution approach for the new tier.  
The third section uses a model developed by Gary 
Burtless1 to demonstrate that even using target date 
funds and full annuitization at retirement, a defined 
contribution approach produces enormous variation 
in outcomes.  The fourth section explores the impli-
cations of modifying these fluctuations.  The final 
section concludes.   
The Need for More 
Retirement Income
People need more retirement saving because the 
existing retirement income system is contracting and 
people are living longer. 
Social Security
At any given retirement age, Social Security ben-
efits will replace a smaller fraction of pre-retirement 
earnings than in the past for three reasons.  First, 
the increase in the Full Retirement Age from 65 to 
67 is equivalent to an across-the-board cut.2  Second, 
premiums for Medicare Part B and for the new Part D 
drug benefit, which are automatically deducted from 
Social Security benefits, are slated to increase sharply 
due to rising health care costs.3  Finally, Social Secu-
rity benefits will be taxed more under the personal 
income tax, as the exemption amounts in the tax code 
are not indexed to inflation, so taxation will move fur-
ther down the income distribution.  As shown in Fig-
ure 1 on the next page, these three factors will reduce 
the net replacement rate for the median worker, who 
claims at age 65, from 39 percent in 2002 to 28 per-
cent in 2030.  Note that this figure does not include 
any additional benefit cuts that might be enacted to 
shore up the solvency of the Social Security program.4 
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Given the decline in Social Security and employer 
provided pensions and the rise in longevity, workers 
could save more.  But that does not appear to be the 
case.  A recent study based on the SCF found that 
median household wealth, excluding Social Security 
and employer defined benefit pensions, has remained 
remarkably constant relative to household income.  
This phenomenon is demonstrated in Figure 3 by the 
fact that the wealth-to-income ratios for each survey 
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Figure 2. Percent of Workers with Pension 
Coverage by Type of Plan from SCF, 1983-2004
Source: Munnell and Sundén (2006).
Private Sector Employer-Sponsored 
Pensions
With a diminished role for Social Security, retirees 
will be increasingly dependent on employer-spon-
sored pensions.  At any moment in time, however, 
less than half of the private sector workforce age 25-
64 participates in an employer-sponsored plan of any 
type.  This fraction has remained virtually unchanged 
since the late 1970s, and is unlikely to improve.5  
Since pension participation tends to increase with 
earnings, only middle- and upper-income individu-
als can count on receiving meaningful benefits from 
employer-sponsored pension plans.
While the level of pension coverage has remained 
flat, the nature of pension coverage has changed 
dramatically.  Twenty years ago, most people with 
pension coverage had a traditional defined benefit 
plan that pays a lifetime annuity at retirement (see 
Figure 2).  Today, most people with a pension have 
a defined contribution plan – typically a 401(k).  In 
theory, workers could accumulate substantial wealth 
in a 401(k) and offset the decline in both Social 
Security and employer provided pensions.  But reality 
looks quite different.  The Federal Reserve’s 2004 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) reports that the 
typical household head approaching retirement (55-
64) had 401(k)/IRA balances of only $60,000.6  Nor 
do younger cohorts seem to be on track to accumulate 
sufficient wealth to support themselves in retirement.
Figure 1. Social Security Replacement Rates for 
the Median Earner, 2002 and 2030












Figure 3. Ratio of Wealth to Income in the SCF, 
by Age Group, Selected Years 1983-2004
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lie on top of one another.  In other words, households 
have not increased their accumulation of wealth to 
offset the demise of employer defined benefit plans 
or the scheduled reduction in Social Security replace-
ment rates.7
Thus, the outlook for retirement income for future 
cohorts of retirees is dismal.8  And it is dismal both 
for those who must rely only on Social Security and 
for those who have a supplementary 401(k) plan.  Ef-
forts to expand coverage through automatic Individual 
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and other proposals im-
ply that those who already have a supplementary plan 
will be adequately prepared for retirement.  Although 
401(k) plans received a boost from the Pension Pro-
tection Act of 2006, which encouraged employers to 
make their plans easier and more automatic, the basic 
fragility of 401(k)s was exposed by the current finan-
cial crisis, which has reduced the value of equities in 
401(k)s/IRAs by about $2 trillion.9  Thus, virtually all 
future retirees will need an additional tier of retire-
ment saving (see Figure 4).
tions in stocks and bonds.  The following discussion 
focuses on the implications of a defined contribution 
approach for a new tier, and parenthetically provides 
information about the inevitable outcomes from the 
401(k) system already in place.  
Accumulating money in an account and then turn-
ing the accumulated balances into a stream of income 
involves two types of financial risk.  The first occurs 
before retirement. Figure 5 shows the real (inflation-
adjusted) returns on stocks and bonds during the 
last hundred years.  Over this period, the average 
real return on stocks was 7.5 percent and on bonds 
2.6 percent.10   The variability, as measured by the 
standard deviation, was much higher for stocks than 
bonds: 19.0 percent compared to 8.4 percent.  
The returns achieved during the 15-year period 
leading up to retirement have an enormous impact on 
replacement rates, as during this period the effect of 
returns on savings dominates the effect of additional 
contributions.  Figure 5 shows the annual average 
real return on stocks and bonds over 15-year periods 
ending 1911 to 2008.  Stock returns varied from nega-
tive numbers in 1920 and 1980 to annual returns in 
excess of 12 percent for 15-year periods ending in the 
mid-1930s, the 1960s, and the 1990s.  













The Defined Contribution 
Approach
If the decision were made to introduce a new tier of 
retirement income, the next question is how that tier 
should be structured.  One option is a defined benefit 
plan where participants contribute towards a fixed 
replacement rate.  The alternative is a defined contri-
bution plan where participants invest their contribu-
Figure 5. Real Returns to Stock and Bonds, 
1911-2008 
Note: To eliminate some of the fluctuations in annual rates 
of return, the chart shows the annual rate of return on a dol-
lar invested in the stock market 15 years before the indicated 
date.  
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401(k) plansThe second source of financial risk occurs if the 
participant wishes to purchase an annuity to avoid 
outliving his or her accumulated wealth.  The price 
of the annuity depends on a host of factors: the age of 
the worker, marketing and other expenses incurred 
by the insurance company, the amount of adverse 
selection (that is, the extent to which only people who 
expect to live for a long time purchase annuities), and 
the interest rate.  If interest rates are high, the insur-
ance company can expect to make substantial earn-
ings on the participant’s initial payment and therefore 
can provide a high monthly amount to the purchaser.  
If interest rates are low at the time the annuity is pur-
chased, the monthly payment will also be low.  
How Market Risk Affects 
Retirement Income
To show how these two types of financial risk can 
affect the retirement income received by participants, 
we adopt a model developed by Gary Burtless.  This 
model involves a number of assumptions.  Workers 
are assumed to enter the workforce at 22, work for 
40 years, retire at age 62, and annuitize their pension 
wealth at retirement.  Each year they contribute 6 per-
cent of their income to their account.  The assump-
tion is that they invest their contributions in a target 
date fund, where the percent in equities at age 25 is 
90 percent, declining to about 45 percent by age 65.  
Real wages are assumed to grow at 2 percent a year.  
Figure 6 shows the total accumulations relative 
to average (age 54-58) earnings for a worker in each 
year.  People who were lucky enough to retire dur-
ing the 1960s would have built up assets equal to 9 
times their average earnings, whereas those retiring 
in the 1980s would have assets equal to less than four 
times earnings.  Or consider a more recent compari-
son.  Those retiring in 2000 would have accumulated 
assets equal to eight times their final earnings, while 
those retiring in 2008 would have had assets of only 
about 6 times earnings. 
The goal, however, is not simply to accumulate a 
pile of assets but to provide retirement income.  The 
most efficient way to transform assets into income 
is to purchase an annuity.  The two types considered 
here are nominal annuities and inflation-adjusted 
annuities.  It is possible that those who had a good 
accumulation experience could face low interest rates 
when it came to purchasing an annuity, or that those 
who had a bad accumulation experience could enjoy 
high interest rates.  In such a case, the purchasing of 
the annuity could mitigate some of the variation in 
accumulated balances.  
Figure 7 shows the initial replacement rate for 
participants retiring and purchasing either a nominal 
or inflation-adjusted annuity in a given year.11  The 
replacement rate for the nominal annuity exceeds that 
for a real annuity, because the latter starts low and 
increases over time in line with changes in the Con-
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Figure 6. Ratio of Assets to Earnings Using a 
Target Date Fund, 1911-2008
Note: Figure shows the ratio of assets to average (age 54-58)
earnings for individuals who enter the labor force at 22 and 
retire at 62.
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Burtless (2000); 
Burtless (2008); and Fidelity (2008).  
Figure 7. Replacement Rate from Real and 
Nominal Annuities Based on Assets Accumulated 
in a Target Date Fund, 1925-2008
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Burtless (2000); 
Burtless (2008); Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia 
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sumer Price Index.  As in the case of accumulations, 
replacement rates vary significantly over time.  To 
take the most recent period as an example, a person 
retiring in October 2000 with an inflation-adjusted 
annuity would have had a replacement rate of 50 
percent whereas someone retiring in October 2008 
would have had a replacement rate of 28 percent.
As to the question of whether interest rates offset 
the accumulation experience, it appears that the an-
swer is ‘somewhat.’  Figure 8 shows a measure of the 
fluctuations – the standard deviation relative to the 
mean – for the ratio of accumulations to income and 
for the two annuity types relative to income.  The real 
and nominal interest rates appear to somewhat offset 
the variability from the accumulation phase.
The bottom line is that the defined contribution 
approach for the provision of retirement income pro-
duces dramatically different levels of retirement in-
come depending on the performance of the markets.  
This story is true even when the participants invest in 
target date funds that reduce their exposure to equity 
markets as they approach retirement.
phase and then provide an inflation-adjusted annuity 
at retirement.  As an example, consider a 3.0 percent 
guaranteed rate, which is likely on the high-end of 
what is feasible.12  Figure 9 compares the outcome 
from such a guarantee, assuming a 5-percent contri-
bution rate, with that from investing an equivalent 
amount in a target date fund.  Three facts emerge 
from this comparison.  First, a guaranteed rate reduc-
es most of the fluctuations, although some remain be-
cause the real interest rate and life expectancies faced 
by annuity providers vary over time.  Second, the 
replacement rate on average is much lower.  That is, 
over the period 1925-2008, the average replacement 
rate using a guaranteed real rate of three percent is 
15 percent compared to 28 percent from the target 
date fund.  Third, in every period, including 1929 and 
2008, the guaranteed return retirement plan would 
have produced a lower replacement rate than the life-
cycle fund, or indeed a 100 percent equity fund.  
Figure 8. Ratio of Standard Deviation to Mean 
of Accumulations to Income, Real Annuity and 
Nominal Annuity, 1925-2008
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Burtless (2000); 
Burtless (2008); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008); 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2008); and Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2008). 
Reducing the Risk in Defined 
Contribution Plans
 
One way to overcome the enormous fluctuations in 
replacement rates described above is to guarantee par-
ticipants a real rate of return during the accumulation 
Figure 9. Replacement Rate from Real Annuity 
From Target Date Fund Versus Fund with 3-Per-
cent Real Return, 1925-2008
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Burtless (2000); 
Burtless (2008); U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008); 
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (2008); and Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2008). 
This simulation highlights the inherent trade-
off between accepting the fluctuations inherent in 
investing in the stock and bond markets and the 
lower return involved in any form of guarantee.  
Although historical data indicate that it is unlikely 
that a household investing in a life-cycle fund would 
obtain a lower replacement rate than one investing in 
a guaranteed fund, the possibility cannot be ruled out, 
particularly if, as many commentators believe, future 
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the past century.  And a household investing in a life-
cycle fund may be lulled into a false sense of security 
by favorable returns in the years leading up to retire-
ment, only to face a calamitous decline in the value of 
its portfolio immediately prior to retirement. 
Conclusion
The analysis in this brief suggests that in a defined 
contribution plan, replacement rates will vary dra-
matically depending on the period over which the 
participant is working and accumulating assets.  This 
pattern occurs even when individuals invest in a 
target date fund.  These accumulation effects are only 
somewhat offset by interest rates at retirement.  
The question is whether such variation is ac-
ceptable in a new tier of retirement income.  If so, 
policymakers would be agreeing to widely different 
replacement rates each year depending on the perfor-
mance of the market over the participants’ working 
years.  If such an outcome is not acceptable, mecha-
nisms would be needed to eliminate some or all of 
the variation.  But such mechanisms are not costless.  
So the challenge becomes one of weighing the costs 
and benefits of alternative approaches.  
The analysis also has implications for the out-
comes of 401(k) plans.  After all, investing in a target 
date fund for forty years, without any withdrawals, 
is as good as a 401(k) participant can do.  Yet these 
simulations show that replacement rates generated 
by even the most effective saving behavior in a 401(k) 
system will vary as much as 32 percentage points 
depending on the performance of the stock market 
and interest rates.   Issue in Brief 7
Endnotes
1  For more details, see Burtless (2000, 2008).
2  Under legislation enacted in 1983, the increase in 
the Full Retirement Age began with those born in 
1938 (turning 62 in 2000) and will be fully phased in 
for those born in 1960 (turning 62 in 2022).
3  The premium for Medicare Part B alone is pro-
jected to increase from 9 percent of the average 
Social Security benefit in 2007 to 12 percent in 2030 
(according to unpublished data from the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2008).
4  For married couples, and most Americans retire as 
part of a married couple, Social Security already re-
places a significantly smaller share of household earn-
ings than it did as recently as 1990, and will replace 
even less going forward (Munnell, Sanzenbacher and 
Soto 2007).  The reason is the dramatic increase in 
the labor force participation of married women.  As 
married households have increasingly relied on the 
earnings of working wives, these earnings have not 
produced a comparable increase in Social Security 
benefits.  The reason is that the program provides a 
guaranteed spousal benefit for the wife equal to 50 
percent of her husband’s Primary Insurance Amount 
– the benefit to which he would be entitled at the Full 
Retirement Age.  The increased labor force participa-
tion of married women will increase the household’s 
Social Security benefits only to the extent that benefits 
based on their earnings records exceed this spousal 
minimum.  The average Social Security replacement 
rate for one-earner couples in the Health and Retire-
ment Study is thus 58 percent compared to 41 percent 
for two-earner couples (Munnell and Soto, 2005).    
 
5  The pension coverage data discussed above apply 
only to individual workers at any given point in time.  
Over a lifetime and on a household – rather than an 
individual – basis, coverage rates are somewhat high-
er.  For households age 55-64, the Federal Reserve’s 
Survey of Consumer Finances shows that approximately 
66 percent of households had some sort of pension 
coverage in 2004.  
6  Munnell and Sundén (2006).
7  Delorme, Munnell, and Webb (2006). 
8  Important studies by John Karl Scholz (Scholz et 
al., 2006, 2008) suggest that Americans up to the 
Early Baby Boom generation are adequately prepared 
for retirement.  Alternatively, Munnell, Webb, and 
Golub-Sass (2007) shows a large decline in prepared-
ness over time, with the initial cohort in the Health 
and Retirement Survey well prepared for retirement 
and the Baby Boom and subsequent cohorts at signifi-
cant risk. 
9  Munnell and Muldoon (2008).
10  Bond returns are measured for investments in 
government bonds with a remaining maturity longer 
than seven years.
11  We assume that individuals purchase a joint life 
and two-thirds survivor annuity.  The annuity is 
priced using Social Security Administration life tables 
for the appropriate birth cohort.  Following Mitchell, 
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999), we assume 
that the annuity has a money’s worth of 84.1 percent 
to a household with population average mortality 
when the income stream is discounted at either the 
ten year treasury bond interest rate (for the nominal 
annuity), or the 10-year Treasury Inflation-Protected 
Securities (TIPS) interest rate (for the real annuity).  
TIPS were first issued in 1997.  For the period 1991 to 
1996, we estimate a real interest rate by deducting the 
ten-year inflation forecast published in the Livingston 
Survey (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, 2008) 
from the ten-year Treasury rate.  For years prior to 
1990, we estimate a forecast inflation rate by first esti-
mating forecast inflation for the period 1991 to 2008 
as a function of the previous five years’ actual infla-
tion, and then back-casting forecast inflation for 1925 
to 1990.  To correct for the abnormal inflation during 
World War II and the Korean War, we substitute aver-
age inflation during the period 1925 to 1940 for actual 
inflation during the period 1941 to 1953.
12  A 3.0 percent real return is consistent with the 
rate used by the Social Security Administration in 
projections of the program’s long-term financial situa-
tion (U.S. Social Security Administration, 2008).  It is 
somewhat higher than the 2.5 percent average return 
on long-term Treasury bonds over the 1926-2005 pe-
riod (Ibbotson Associates, 2006) and the 2.8 percent 
average yield on 10-year Treasury Inflation-Protected 
Securities (TIPS) over the past 12 years.  Because 
interest rates can fluctuate substantially, no private 
insurer would be able to provide such guaranteed 
returns.  Therefore, any meaningful guarantee would 
require government involvement.Center for Retirement Research 8
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